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1Secure State Estimation against Sensor Attacks in
the Presence of Noise
Shaunak Mishra, Yasser Shoukry, Nikhil Karamchandani, Suhas Diggavi and Paulo Tabuada
Abstract—We consider the problem of estimating the state of
a noisy linear dynamical system when an unknown subset of
sensors is arbitrarily corrupted by an adversary. We propose a
secure state estimation algorithm, and derive (optimal) bounds
on the achievable state estimation error given an upper bound
on the number of attacked sensors. The proposed state estimator
involves Kalman filters operating over subsets of sensors to search
for a sensor subset which is reliable for state estimation. To
further improve the subset search time, we propose Satisfiability
Modulo Theory based techniques to exploit the combinatorial
nature of searching over sensor subsets. Finally, as a result of
independent interest, we give a coding theoretic view of attack
detection and state estimation against sensor attacks in a noiseless
dynamical system.
I. INTRODUCTION
Securing cyber-physical systems (CPS) is a problem of
growing importance as the vast majority of today’s critical
infrastructure is managed by such systems. In this context,
it is crucial to understand the fundamental limits for state
estimation, an integral aspect of CPS, in the presence of
malicious attacks. With this motivation, we focus on securely
estimating the state of a linear dynamical system from a
set of noisy and maliciously corrupted sensor measurements.
We restrict the sensor attacks to be sparse in nature, i.e., an
adversary can arbitrarily corrupt an unknown subset of sensors
in the system but is restricted by an upper bound on the number
of attacked sensors.
Several recent works have studied the problem of secure
state estimation against sensor attacks in linear dynamical
systems. For setups with no noise in sensor measurements,
the results reported in [2], [3], [4] show that, given a strong
notion of observability, (sparse) sensor attacks can always be
detected and isolated, and we can exactly estimate the state
of the system. However, with noisy sensors, it is not trivial to
distinguish between the noise and the attacks injected by an
adversary. Prior work on state estimation with sensor attacks
in the presence of noise can be broadly divided into two
categories depending on the noise model: 1) bounded non-
stochastic noise, and 2) Gaussian noise. Results reported in
[5], [6], [7] deal with bounded non-stochastic noise. Though
they provide sufficient conditions for distinguishing the sparse
S. Mishra, Y. Shoukry, S. Diggavi and P. Tabuada are with the Elec-
trical Engineering Department, University of California, Los Angeles,
CA 90095-1594, USA (e-mail: {shaunakmishra, yshoukry, suhasdiggavi,
tabuada}@ucla.edu). N. Karamchandani is with the Electrical Engineering
Department, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, Mumbai-400076, India
(email: nikhilk@ee.iitb.ac.in). The work was supported by NSF grant 1136174
and DARPA under agreement number FA8750-12-2-0247. A preliminary
version of this work appeared in the proceedings of ISIT 2015 [1].
attack vector from bounded noise, they do not guarantee the
optimality of their estimation algorithm. The problem we focus
on in this paper falls in the second category, i.e., sensor
attacks in the presence of Gaussian noise. Prior work in this
category includes [8], [9], [10], [11]. In [8], the focus is
on detecting a class of sensor attacks called replay attacks
where the attacker replaces legitimate sensor outputs with
outputs from previous time instants. In [9], the performance
degradation of a scalar Kalman filter (i.e., scalar state and a
single sensor) is studied when the (single) sensor is under
attack. They do not study attack sparsity across multiple
sensors, and in addition, they focus on an adversary whose
objective is to degrade the estimation performance without
being detected (leading to a restricted class of sensor attacks).
In [10] and [11], robustification approaches for state estimation
against sparse sensor attacks are studied. However, they lack
optimality guarantees against arbitrary sensor attacks.
In this paper, we study a general linear dynamical system
with process and sensor noises having a Gaussian distribution,
and give (optimal) guarantees on the achievable state estima-
tion error against arbitrary sensor attacks. The following toy
example is illustrative of the nature of the problem addressed
in this paper and some of the ideas behind our solution.
Example 1. Consider a linear dynamical system with a scalar
state x(t) such that x(t+ 1) = x(t) +w(t), and three sensors
(indexed by d ∈ {1, 2, 3}) with outputs yd(t) = x(t) + vd(t);
where w(t) and vd(t) are the process noise and sensor noise at
sensor d respectively. The process and sensor noises follow a
zero mean Gaussian distribution with i.i.d. instantiations over
time. The sensor noise is also independent across sensors.
Now, consider an adversary which can attack any one of the
sensors in the system and arbitrarily change its output. In the
absence of sensor noise, it is trivial to detect such an attack
since the two good sensors (not attacked by the adversary)
will have the same output. Hence, a majority based rule on
the outputs leads to the exact state. However, in the presence
of sensor noise, a difference in outputs across sensors can also
be attributed to the noise, and thus cannot be considered an
attack indicator. As a consequence of results in this paper, in
this example we can identify a subset of two sensors which can
be reliably used for state estimation despite an adversary who
can attack any one of the three noisy sensors. In particular,
our approach for this example would be to search for a subset
of two sensors which satisfy the following check: over a large
enough time window, the outputs from the two sensors are
consistent with the Kalman state estimate based on outputs
from the same subset of sensors. Furthermore, we can show
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
02
46
2v
2 
 [m
ath
.O
C]
  1
2 O
ct 
20
15
2that such an approach leads to the optimal state estimation
error for the given adversarial setup.
In this paper, we generalize the Kalman filter based ap-
proach in the above example to a general linear dynamical
system with sensor and process noise. The Kalman estimate
based check mentioned in the above example forms the basis
of a detector for an effective attack; a notion that we introduce
in this paper. For state estimation, we search for a sensor
subset which passes such an effective attack detector, and then
use outputs from such a sensor subset for state estimation.
We also derive impossibility results (lower bounds) on the
state estimation error in our adversarial setup, and show that
our proposed state estimation algorithm is optimal in the
sense that it achieves these lower bounds. To further reduce
the sensor subset search time for the state estimator, we
propose Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT) based techniques
to harness the combinatorial nature of the search problem,
and demonstrate the improvements in search time through
numerical experiments.
As a result of independent interest, we give a coding
theoretic interpretation (alternate proof) for the necessary and
sufficient conditions for secure state estimation in the absence
of noise [3], [4], [6] (known as the sparse observability condi-
tion). In particular, we relate the sparse observability condition
required for attack detection and secure state estimation in
dynamical systems to the Hamming distance requirements for
error detection and correction [12] in classical coding theory.
The remainder of this paper1 is organized as follows.
Section II deals with the setup and problem formulation. In
Section III, we describe our effective attack detector followed
by Section IV on our main results for effective attack detection
and secure state estimation. Section V deals with SMT based
techniques and Section VI with the experimental results.
Finally, Section VII describes the coding theoretic view for
attack detection and secure state estimation.
II. SETUP
In this section, we discuss the adversarial setup along with
assumptions on the underlying dynamical system, and provide
a mathematical formulation of the state estimation problem
considered in this paper.
A. Notation
The symbols N,R and B denote the sets of natural, real,
and Boolean numbers respectively. The symbol ∧ denotes
the logical AND operator. The support of a vector x ∈ Rn,
denoted by supp(x), is the set of indices of the non-zero
elements of x. If s is a set, |s| is the cardinality of s.
For the matrix M ∈ Rm×n, unless stated otherwise, we
denote by Mi ∈ R1×n the ith row of the matrix. For the
set s ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}, we denote by Ms ∈ R|s|×n the matrix
obtained from M by removing all the rows except those
1Compared to the preliminary version [1], this paper differs in the presen-
tation of results through effective attack detection. In addition, we reduce the
complexity of the state estimation algorithm in [1] and also describe SMT
based techniques for reducing the subset search time.
indexed by s. We use tr (M) to denote the trace of the matrix
M. If the matrix M is symmetric, we use λmin (M) and
λmax (M) to denote the minimum and maximum eigenvalue
of M respectively. We denote by Sn+ the set of all n × n
positive semi-definite matrices. For a random variable x ∈ Rn,
we denote its mean by E (x) ∈ R and its covariance by
V ar(x) ∈ Sn+. For a discrete time random process {x(t)}t∈N,
the sample average of x using N samples starting at time t1
is defined as follows:
EN,t1 (x) =
1
N
t1+N−1∑
t=t1
x(t). (1)
We denote by Im ∈ Rm×m and 1m ∈ Rm×1 the identity
matrix of dimension m and the vector of all ones respectively.
The notation x(t) ∼ N (µ,Ω) is used to denote an i.i.d.
Gaussian random process with mean µ and covariance matrix
Ω. Finally, we use the symbol 4 for element-wise comparison
between matrices. That is, for two matrices A and B of the
same size, A 4 B is true if and only if each element ai,j is
smaller than or equal to bi,j .
B. System model
We consider a linear dynamical system Σa with sensor
attacks as shown below:
Σa
{
x (t+ 1) = Ax(t) + Bu(t) + w(t),
y(t) = Cx(t) + v(t) + a(t),
(2)
where x(t) ∈ Rn denotes the state of the plant at time t ∈ N,
u(t) ∈ Rm denotes the input at time t, w(t) ∼ N (0, σ2wIn)
denotes the process noise at time t, y(t) ∈ Rp denotes the
output of the plant at time t and v(t) ∼ N (0, σ2vIp) denotes
the sensor noise at time t. Both v(t) and w(t) have i.i.d.
instantiations over time, and v(t) is independent of w(t). In
addition, we denote the output and (sensor) noise at sensor i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , p} at time t as yi(t) ∈ R and vi(t) ∈ R respectively.
We assume that the input u(t) is known at all time. Hence, its
contribution to the output y(t) is also known, and therefore,
u(t) can be ignored. That is, for the rest of the paper, and
without loss of generality, we consider the case of u(t) = 0
for all time t ∈ N.
The sensor attack vector a(t) ∈ Rp in (2) is introduced by
a k-adversary defined as follows.
Assumption 1. A k-adversary can corrupt any k out of the p
sensors in the system.
Specifically, let κ ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p} denote the set of attacked
sensors (with |κ| = k). The k-adversary can observe the actual
outputs in the k attacked sensors and change them arbitrarily.
For an attack free sensor j /∈ κ, aj(t) = 0 for all time t ∈ N.
Assumption 2. The adversary’s choice of κ is unknown but
is assumed to be constant over time (static adversary).
Assumption 3. The adversary is assumed to have unbounded
computational power, and knows the system parameters (e.g.,
A and C) and noise statistics (e.g., σ2w and σ
2
v).
3However, the adversary is limited to have only causal
knowledge of the process and sensor noise as stated by the
following two assumptions.
Assumption 4. The adversary’s knowledge at time t is statis-
tically independent of w(t′) for t′ > t, i.e., a(t) is statistically
independent of {w(t′)}t′>t.
Assumption 5. For an attack-free sensor i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} \ κ,
the adversary’s knowledge at time t (and hence a(t)) is
statistically independent of {vi(t′)}t′>t.
Intuitively, Assumptions 4 and 5 limit the adversary to have
only causal knowledge of the process noise and the sensor
noise in good sensors (not attacked by the adversary). Note
that, apart from Assumptions 4 and 5, we do not impose
any restrictions on the statistical properties, boundedness and
the time evolution of the corruptions introduced by the k-
adversary.
In the following subsections, we first introduce the (ef-
fective) attack detection problem, followed by the (optimal)
secure state estimation problem. As we show later in the paper
(in Section IV), our solution for the effective attack detection
problem is used as a crucial component for solving the secure
state estimation problem.
C. Effective Attack Detection Problem
In this section, we introduce our notion of effective (sensor)
attacks and formulate the problem of detecting them. Recall
that in the absence of sensor attacks, using a Kalman filter
for estimating the state in (2) leads to the (optimal) minimum
mean square error (MMSE) covariance asymptotically [13].
In this context, our notion of effective attacks is based on
the following intuition: if we naively use a Kalman filter for
state estimation in the presence of an adversary, an attack
is effective when it causes a higher empirical error variance
compared to the attack-free case. Before we formally state our
definition of effective attacks, we first setup some notation for
Kalman filters as described below.
We denote by xˆs(t) the state estimate of a Kalman filter at
time t using outputs till time t − 1 from the sensor subset
s ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p}. Since we use outputs till time t − 1,
we essentially use the prediction version of a Kalman filter
as opposed to filtering where outputs till time t are used
to compute xˆs(t). In this paper, we state our results using
the prediction version of the Kalman filter; the extension
for the filtering version is straightforward (for details about
the filtering version of our results, see Appendix C). In
addition to xˆs(t), we denote by xˆ?s(t) the Kalman filter state
estimate at time t using sensor subset s when all the sensors
in s are attack-free. We eliminate the subscript s from the
previous notation whenever the Kalman filter uses all sensor
measurements, i.e., when s = {1, . . . , p}. In this paper, for the
sake of simplicity, we assume that all the Kalman filters we
consider (in our proposed algorithms and their analysis) are in
steady state [13] when they use uncorrupted sensor outputs.
Hence, in the absence of attacks, the error covariance matrix
P?(t) ∈ S+n defined as:
P?(t) = P? = E
(
(x(t)− xˆ?(t)) (x(t)− xˆ?(t))T
)
,
does not depend on time. In a similar spirit, we define the error
covariance matrix P?s ∈ S+n corresponding to sensor subset
s ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p} as:
P?s = E(x(t)− xˆ?s(t))(x(t)− xˆ?s(t))T .
Note that the error covariance matrix depends on the set of
sensors involved in estimating the state. Also, the steady state
error has zero mean, i.e., E (x(t)− xˆ?s(t)) = 0. Using the
above notation, we define an (, s)-effective attack as follows.
Definition 1 ((, s)-Effective Attack). Consider the linear
dynamical system under attack Σa as defined in (2), and a
k-adversary satisfying Assumptions 1-5. For the set of sensors
s, an  > 0, and a large enough N ∈ N, an attack signal is
called (, s)-effective at time t1 if the following bound holds:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
ese
T
s
))
> tr(P?s) + ,
where es(t) = x(t)− xˆs(t), and EN,t1(·) denotes the sample
average as defined (1).
In other words, an attack is called (, s)-effective if it can
lead to a higher estimation error compared to the optimal
estimation error in the absence of sensor attacks, using the
same set of sensors s. An attack is called (, s)-ineffective
if it is not (, s)-effective. Essentially, we use EN,t1
(
ese
T
s
)
as a proxy for the state estimation error covariance matrix
in the presence of attacks; a sample average is used instead
of an expectation because the resultant error in the presence
of attacks may not be ergodic. Also, since xˆs(t) is computed
using all measurements from time 0 till time t−1, Definition 1
implicitly takes into consideration the effect of attack signal
a(t) for the time window starting from 0 till time t+N − 1.
Using the above notion of an (, s)-effective attack, we
define the -effective attack detection problem as follows.
Problem 1. [-Effective Attack Detection Problem] Consider
the linear dynamical system under attack Σa as defined in (2),
and a k-adversary satisfying Assumptions 1-5. Let sall be the
set of all sensors, i.e., sall = {1, . . . , p}. Given an  > 0,
construct an attack indicator dˆattack ∈ {0, 1} such that:
dˆattack(t1) =
{
1 if the attack is (, sall)-effective at time t1
0 otherwise.
D. Optimal Secure State Estimation Problem
We now focus on the problem of estimating the state from
the adversarially corrupted sensors. We start by showing a
negative result stating that a certain estimation error bound
may be impossible to achieve in the presence of a k-adversary.
To do so, we define the sensor set that contains p− k sensors
and corresponds to the worst case Kalman estimate as:
sworst,p−k = arg max
s⊆{1,2,...,p},
|s|=p−k
tr(P?s). (3)
The impossibility result can now be stated as follows.
Theorem 1 (Impossibility). Consider the linear dynamical
system under attack Σa as defined in (2), and an oracle
4MMSE estimator that has knowledge of κ, i.e., the set of
sensors attacked by a k-adversary. Then, there exists a choice
of sensors κ and an attack sequence a(t) such that the trace of
the error covariance of the oracle estimator is bounded from
below as follows:
tr
(
E
(
e(t)eT (t)
)) ≥ tr(P?sworst,p−k), (4)
where e(t) above is the oracle estimator’s error.
Proof. Consider the attack scenario where the outputs from
all attacked sensors are equal to zero, i.e., the corruption
aj(t) = −Cjx(t) − vj(t), ∀j ∈ κ. Hence, the information
collected from the attacked sensors cannot enhance the esti-
mation performance. Accordingly, the estimation performance
from the remaining sensors is the best one can expect to
achieve. Hence, the result follows by picking κ such that
κ = {1, . . . , p} \ sworst,p−k.
In the context of Theorem 1, we define a state estimate to be
optimal if it is guaranteed to achieve the lower bound shown
in (4). This can be formalized as follows.
Problem 2. [Optimal Secure State Estimation Problem]
Consider the linear dynamical system under attack Σa as
defined in (2), and a k-adversary satisfying Assumptions 1-5.
For a time window G = {t1, t1+1, . . . , t1+N−1}, construct
the state estimates {xˆ(t)}t∈G such that:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
eeT
)) ≤ tr(P?sworst,p−k),
where e(t) = x(t)− xˆ(t) is the state estimation error.
Similarly to Definition 1, we use the sample average
EN,t1
(
eeT
)
in Problem 2 (and not expectation) since the
resultant error in the presence of attacks may not be ergodic.
III. SPARSE OBSERVABILITY AND (, s)-EFFECTIVE
ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, we first describe the notion of k-sparse
observability [4]. This notion plays an important role in deter-
mining when Problems 1 and 2 are solvable. After describing
sparse observability, we describe an algorithm for (, s)-
effective attack detection which leverages sparse observability
for its performance guarantees.
A. k-Sparse Observability
Definition 2. (k-Sparse Observable System) The linear dy-
namical system under attack Σa as defined in (2), is said to
be k-sparse observable if for every set s ⊆ {1, . . . , p} with
|s| = p− k, the pair (A,Cs) is observable.
In other words, a system is k-sparse observable if it remains
observable after eliminating any choice of k sensors. In the
absence of sensor and process noise, the conditions under
which exact (i.e., zero error) state estimation can be done
despite sensor attacks have been studied in [3], [4], [6] where
it is shown that 2k-sparse observability is necessary and
sufficient for exact state estimation against a k-adversary. In
Section VII, we provide a coding theoretic interpretation for
this condition in the context of attack detection and secure
state estimation in any noiseless dynamical system.
B. (, s)-Effective Attack Detector
In this section, we describe an algorithm based on the sparse
observability condition for detecting an (, s)-effective attack.
We first introduce some additional notation, followed by the
description of the algorithm and its performance guarantee.
1) Additional notation: Let the sensors be indexed by i ∈
{1, 2, . . . , p}. We define the following observability matrices:
Oi =

CTi
CTi A
...
CTi A
µi−1
 , O =

O1
O2
...
Op
 , (5)
where Oi is the observability matrix for sensor i (with observ-
ability index µi as shown in (5)) and O is the observability
matrix for the entire system (i.e., p sensors) formed by stacking
the observability matrices for the sensors. Similarly, for any
sensor subset s ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p}, we denote the observability
matrix for s by Os (formed by stacking the observability
matrices of sensors in s). Without loss of generality, we will
consider the observability index µi = n for each sensor. For
any sensor subset s with |s| > k, we define λmin,s\k as
follows:
λmin,s\k = min
s1⊂s, |s1|=|s|−k
λmin
(
OTs1Os1
)
, (6)
where λmin
(
OTs1Os1
)
denotes the minimum eigenvalue of
OTs1Os1 . We define matrices Ji, J and M as shown below:
Ji =

0 0 . . . 0
CTi 0 . . . 0
CTi A C
T
i . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
CTi A
µi−2 CTi A
µi−3 . . . CTi
 , J =

J1
J2
...
Jp
 ,
M = σ2wJJ
T + σ2vInp. (7)
In a similar spirit, Js is defined for a sensor subset s by
stacking Ji for i ∈ s, and Ms = σ2wJsJTs +σ2vIn|s|. We use the
following notation for sensor outputs and noises corresponding
to a time window of size µi = n (observability index):
yi(t) =

yi(t)
yi(t+ 1)
...
yi(t+ µi − 1)
 , vi(t) =

vi(t)
vi(t+ 1)
...
vi(t+ µi − 1)
 ,
y¯(t) =

y1(t)
y2(t)
...
yp(t)
 , v¯(t) =

v1(t)
v2(t)
...
vp(t)
 , w¯(t) =

w(t)
w(t+ 1)
...
w(t+ n− 1)
 ,
(8)
where yi(t) and vi(t) denote the output and sensor noise at
sensor i at time t respectively.
5Algorithm 1 ATTACK-DETECT(s, t1)
1: Run a Kalman filter that uses all measurements from
sensors indexed by s until time t1 − 1 and compute the
estimate xˆs(t1) ∈ Rn.
2: Recursively repeat the previous step N − 1 times to
calculate all estimates xˆs(t) ∈ Rn, ∀t ∈ G = {t1, t1 +
1, . . . , t1 +N − 1}.
3: For time t ∈ G, calculate the block residue:
rs(t) = y¯s(t)− Osxˆs(t) ∀t ∈ G.
4: if block residue test defined below holds,
EN,t1
(
rsr
T
s
)− (OsP?sOTs + Ms) 4 η 1n|s|1Tn|s|,
where 0 < η ≤
(
λmin,s\k
3n(|s|−k)
)
 , then
5: assert dˆattack,s(t1) := 0
6: else
7: assert dˆattack,s(t1) := 1
8: end if
9: return (dˆattack,s(t1), {xˆs(t)}t∈G)
2) Attack Detection Algorithm: We consider the attack
detection problem for a time window G = {t1, t1+1, . . . , t1+
N−1} , and assume without loss of generality that the window
size N is divisible by n. For a sensor subset s with |s| > k, we
start by computing the state estimate xˆs(t1) obtained through
a Kalman filter that uses measurements collected from time
0 up to time t1 − 1 from all sensors indexed by the subset
s. Using this estimate, we can calculate the block residue
rs(t1) which is the discrepancy between the estimated output
yˆs(t1) = Osxˆs(t1) and the actual output ys(t1), i.e.,
rs(t1) = ys(t1)− yˆs(t1) = ys(t1)− Osxˆs(t1). (9)
By repeating the previous procedure N − 1 times, we can
obtain the sequence of residues {rs(t)}t∈G. The next step is
to calculate the sample average of rs(t)rTs (t), and compare
the sample average with the expected value of rs(t)rTs (t) in
the case when sensor subset s is attack-free. This can be done
using the following (block) residue test:
EN,t1
(
rsr
T
s
)− (OsP?sOTs + Ms) 4 η 1n|s|1Tn|s|, (10)
for some η > 0. Simply put, the residue test just checks
whether the sample average of rs(t)rTs (t) over the time win-
dow G is close to its attack-free expected value OsP?sO
T
s +Ms
(details in Section III-C). It is crucial to recall that the attack-
free estimation error covariance matrix P?s used in (10) can be
computed offline [13] without the need for any data collected
from attack-free sensors. If the element-wise comparison in
the residue test (10) is valid, we set the attack detection flag
dˆattack,s(t1) to zero indicating that no attack was detected in
sensor subset s. This procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
C. Performance Guarantees
In this subsection, we describe our first main result which
is concerned with the correctness of Algorithm 1.
Lemma 1. Let the linear dynamical system as defined in (2)
be 2k-sparse observable. Consider a k-adversary satisfying
Assumptions 1− 5 and a sensor subset s ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p} with
|s| ≥ p − k. For any  > 0 and δ > 0, there exists a large
enough time window length N such that when Algorithm 1
terminates with dˆattack,s(t1) = 0, the following probability
bound holds:
P
(
tr
(
Et1,N
(
ese
T
s
)−P?s) ≤ ) ≥ 1− δ, (11)
where es(t) = x(t)− xˆs(t). In other words, for large enough
N , the bound tr
(
Et1,N
(
ese
T
s
)−P?s) ≤  holds with high
probability2 (w.h.p.). Moreover, if the attack is an (, s)-
effective attack, the following also holds:
P
(
dˆattack,s(t1) = dattack,s(t1)
)
≥ 1− δ, (12)
where dˆattack,s(t1) is the output of Algorithm 1 while
dattack,s(t1) is the output of an oracle detector that knows the
exact set of attacked sensors. Hence, Algorithm 1 can detect
any (, s)-effective attack w.h.p. for large enough N .
Proof of Lemma 1. We focus only on showing that (11) holds
whenever Algorithm 1 terminates with dˆattack,s(t1) = 0; the
rest of the lemma follows easily from Definition 1. Since we
assume that the set s has cardinality |s| ≥ p − k, we can
conclude that there exists a subset sg ⊂ s with cardinality
|sg| ≥ p − 2k sensors such that all its sensors are attack-
free (subscript g in sg stands for good sensors in s). Hence,
by decomposing the set s into an attack-free set sg and a
potentially attacked set s \ sg , we can conclude that, after a
permutation similarity transformation for (10), the following
holds for the attack-free subset sg:
EN,t1
(
rsgr
T
sg
)
− OsgP?sOTsg −Msg 4 η 1n(|s|−k)1Tn(|s|−k).
Therefore,
tr
(
EN,t1
(
rsgr
T
sg
)
− OsgP?sOTsg −Msg
)
≤ n(|s| − k)η = 1. (13)
Similarly, after a suitable permutation Π, we can decompose
the block residue rs(t) defined in equation (9) as follows:
Π (rs(t)) =
[
rsg (t)
rs\sg (t)
]
=
[
ysg (t)− Osg xˆs(t)
ys\sg (t)− Os\sg xˆs(t)
]
=
[
Osgx(t) + Jsgw¯(t) + v¯sg (t)− Osg xˆs(t)
ys\sg (t)− Os\sg xˆs(t)
]
=
[
Osges(t) + zsg (t)
ys\sg (t)− Os\sg xˆs(t)
]
, (14)
where zsg (t) = Jsgw¯(t) + v¯sg (t). Using (14), we can rewrite
tr
(
EN,t1
(
rsgr
T
sg
))
as:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
rsgr
T
sg
))
= tr
(
OsgEN,t1
(
ese
T
s
)
OTsg
)
+ tr
(
EN,t1
(
zsgz
T
sg
))
2 By stating that the bound holds with high probability for large enough N ,
we mean that for any δ > 0 and  > 0, ∃Nδ, ∈ N such that for N > Nδ,,
P
(
tr
(
Et1,N
(
eseTs
)−P?s) ≤ ) ≥ 1− δ.
6+ 2EN,t1
(
eTs O
T
sgzsg
)
. (15)
By combining (13) and (15):
tr
(
OsgEN,t1
(
ese
T
s
)
OTsg − OsgP?sOTsg
)
≤ tr (Msg)− tr (EN,t1 (zsgzTsg))+ 1
− 2EN,t1
(
eTs O
T
sgzsg
)
(a)
≤ 21 − 2EN,t1
(
eTs O
T
sgzsg
)
(16)
(b)
≤ 31, (17)
where (a) follows w.h.p. due to the law of large num-
bers (LLN) for large enough N (details in Appendix A1),
and (b) follows w.h.p. by showing that the cross term
2EN,t1
(
eTOTsgzsg
)
has zero mean and vanishingly small vari-
ance for large enough N . The cross term analysis is described
in detail in Appendix A2. Now recall that for any two matrices,
A and B of appropriate dimensions, tr (AB) = tr (BA).
Using this fact along with (17), the following holds:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
ese
T
s −P?s
)
OTsgOsg
)
≤ 31, (18)
and hence, we get the following bound which completes the
proof:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
ese
T
s
)−P?s) (c)≤ 31
λmin
(
OTsgOsg
) (d)≤ 31
λmin,s\k
≤ 
(19)
where (c) follows from Lemma 3 in Appendix B and (d)
follows from the definition of λmin,s\k. Note that, it follows
from |sg| ≥ p − 2k and 2k-sparse observability, that both
λmin
(
OTsgOsg
)
and λmin,s\k are bounded away from zero.
IV. EFFECTIVE ATTACK DETECTION AND SECURE STATE
ESTIMATION
Based on the performance guarantees for the ATTACK-
DETECT algorithm described in Section III, in this section
we describe our main results for Problems 1 and 2.
A. Attack detection
We start by showing a solution to Problem 1 (-effective
attack detection), which follows directly from Lemma 1.
Theorem 2. Let the linear dynamical system defined in (2)
be k-sparse observable system. Consider a k-adversary sat-
isfying Assumptions 1-5, and the detector dˆattack(t1) =
ATTACK-DETECT(sall, t1) where the set sall = {1, . . . , p}.
Then, for large enough time window length N , w.h.p. dˆattack(t1)
is equal to the attack indicator which solves Problem 1.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 1. In the
proof of Lemma 1, we basically required the set of good
sensors sg to form an observable system. Similarly, while
checking for effective attacks on a sensor set of size p, we
require the set of good sensors (of size ≥ p − k) to form an
Algorithm 2 EXHAUSTIVE SEARCH
1: Enumerate all sets s ∈ S such that:
S = {s|s ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , p}, |s| = p− k}.
2: Exhaustively search for s∗ ∈ S for which dattack,s∗(t1) = 0
and use xˆs∗(t) for t ∈ G as the state estimate.
observable system in order to repeat the steps in the proof
for Lemma 1; this requirement is guaranteed by the k-sparse
observability condition. On a related note, in Section VII,
we give a coding theoretic interpretation for the k-sparse
observability requirement for attack detection.
B. Secure State Estimation
Algorithm 2 describes our proposed solution for Problem 2
(secure state estimation). As described in Algorithm 2, we
exhaustively enumerate
(
p
p−k
)
sensor subsets of size p − k,
and then apply ATTACK-DETECT on each sensor subset until
we find one subset s∗ for which ATTACK-DETECT returns
dˆattack,s∗(t1) = 0 indicating that the subset is (-effective)
attack-free. The following theorem states the performance
guarantees associated with Algorithm 2.
Theorem 3. Let the linear dynamical system defined in (2)
be 2k-sparse observable system. Consider a k-adversary sat-
isfying Assumptions 1-5. Consider the state estimate xˆs∗(t)
computed by Algorithm 2. Then, for any  > 0 and δ > 0,
there exists a large enough N such that:
P
(
tr
(
EN,t1
(
es∗e
T
s∗
)) ≤ tr (P?sworst,p−k)+ ) ≥ 1− δ,
(20)
where es∗(t) = x(t) − xˆs∗(t) is the estimation
error using xˆs∗(t) as the state estimate. In other
words, w.h.p. Algorithm 2 achieves the bound
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
∑
t∈G
eTs∗(t)es∗(t) ≤ tr
(
P?sworst,p−k
)
.
Proof. The result follows from Lemma 1 which ensures
that, in the absence of the (, s)-effective attack prop-
erty, the calculated state estimate still guarantees the
bound (11). This in turn implies that, in the worst case,
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
∑
t∈G
eTs∗(t)es∗(t) = tr
(
P?sworst,p−k
)
is achievable.
However, since the k-adversary may not always attack
the worst case set of sensors sworst,p−k, we can replace
the equality sign above with an inequality, leading to
lim sup
N→∞
1
N
∑
t∈G
eTs∗(t)es∗(t) ≤ tr
(
P?sworst,p−k
)
.
V. REDUCING SEARCH TIME USING SATISFIABILITY
MODULO THEORY SOLVING
Algorithm 2 exhaustively explores all combinations of p−k
sensors until a set s∗ satisfying dattack,s∗(t1) = 0 is found. In
this section, we explore the idea of using sophisticated search
techniques in order to harness the underlying combinatorial
aspect of the secure state estimation problem. In particular,
we extend previous work by the authors and co-workers on
using Satisfiability Modulo Theory (SMT)-like solvers [5],
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b2
b3
{1, 1, 1}{1, 1, 0}
b3
{1, 0, 1}{1, 0, 0}
b2
b3
{0, 1, 1}{0, 1, 0}
b3
{0, 0, 1}
(a) A tree showing all the combinations of three Boolean indica-
tor variables b1, b2, b3 when a conflicting certificate of the form
φcert := b1 + b2 + b3 ≥ 1 is generated. The missing combination {0, 0, 0}
is the only one that is eliminated as a result of this certificate.
b1
b2
b3
{1, 1, 1}
b3
{1, 0, 1}
b2
b3
{0, 1, 1}
b3
{0, 0, 1}
(b) A tree showing all the combinations of three Boolean indicator variables
b1, b2, b3 when a conflicting certificate of the form φcert := b3 ≥ 1 is gener-
ated. The missing four combinations {0, 0, 0}, {0, 1, 0}, {1, 0, 0}, {1, 1, 0}
are eliminated as a result of this certificate.
Fig. 1. Pictorial example illustrating the effect of generating smaller conflicting certificates.
developed for the noiseless case, in order to improve the search
time while preserving optimality of the solution.
The driving concept behind SMT solvers can be summarized
as follows. First, the search space of all sensor subsets with
cardinality p−k, is encoded using Boolean variables (the num-
ber of Boolean variables increases linearly with the number
of sensors), and a Boolean search engine (e.g., SAT solver) is
used in order to traverse the search space. Whenever the SAT
solver suggests one possible solution in the search space, a
higher level solver (typically referred to as the Theory-solver)
is used to check the correctness of that particular solution.
Finally, in order to prevent the SAT solver from enumerating
all possible solutions in the search space, the Theory-solver
generates counter examples (certificates), explaining why a
particular solution is not valid. Each certificate is used by
the SAT solver in order to prune the search space and
hence enhance the performance of the overall algorithm. This
methodology of “counter-example guided search” effectively
breaks the secure state estimation problem into two simpler
tasks over the Boolean and Reals domain. Further details about
this technique are described below.
A. Overall Architecture
We start by introducing a Boolean indicator variable b =
(b1, . . . , bp) ∈ Bp where the assignment bi = 1 hypothesizes
that the ith sensor is under attack while the assignment bi = 0
hypothesizes that the ith sensor is attack-free. Using this
indicator variable, b, we start by asking the (pseudo-)Boolean
SAT solver to assign values to b in order to satisfy the
following formula:
φ(0) ::=
p∑
i=1
bi ≤ k, (21)
which ensures that at most k sensors are going to be hypothe-
sized as being under attack (the addition in (21) is over Reals).
In the next step, this hypothesized assignment is then
checked by the theory solver. This is done by run-
ning the ATTACK-DETECT algorithm (Algorithm 1) using
only the set of hypothesized attack-free sensors s(b) =
{1, . . . , p} − supp(b). If the ATTACK-DETECT algorithm re-
turns dˆattack,s(b) = 0 then our solver approves this hypothesis
and the algorithm terminates. Otherwise, an UNSAT certificate
(also known as a counter-example) is generated explaining
why this assignment of b is not valid (i.e., a conflict). A
trivial UNSAT certificate that can always be generated takes
the following form (in iteration j):
φcert(j) ::=
∑
i∈s(b)
bi ≥ 1, (22)
which ensures that the current assignment of the variable b
is excluded. Once this UNSAT certificate is generated, the
(pseudo-)Boolean SAT solver is then invoked again in the next
iteration with the following constraints:
φ(j + 1) ::= φ(j) ∧ φcert(j),
until one assignment of the variable b passes the attack
detection test. This procedure is summarized in Algorithm 3.
B. Conflicting Certificates
The generated UNSAT certificates heavily affect the overall
execution time. Smaller UNSAT certificates prune the search
space faster. For simplicity, consider the example shown in
Figure 1 where the vector b has only three elements. On one
hand, an UNSAT certificate that has the form φcert = b1+b2+
b3 ≥ 1 leads to pruning only one sample in the search space.
On the other hand, a smaller UNSAT certificate that has the
form φcert = b1 ≥ 1 eliminates four samples in the search
space which is indeed a higher reduction, and hence leads to
better execution time.
To generate a compact (i.e., smaller) Boolean constraint that
explains a conflict, we aim to find a small set of sensors that
cannot all be attack-free. To do so, we start by removing
one sensor from the set s(b) and run the ATTACK-DETECT
algorithm on the reduced set s′(b) to obtain dˆattack,s′(b). If
dˆattack,s′(b) still equals one (which indicates that set s′(b) still
contains a conflicting set of sensors), we generate the more
compact certificate:
φcert(j) ::=
∑
i∈s′(b)
bi ≥ 1. (23)
We continue removing sensors one by one until we cannot find
any more conflicting sensor sets. Indeed, the order in which
the sensors are removed is going to affect the overall execution
time. In Algorithm 4 we implement a heuristic (for choosing
this order) which is inspired by the strategy we adopted in the
noiseless case [5].
Note that the reduced sets s′(b) are used only to generate
the UNSAT certificates. Hence, it is direct to show that
8Algorithm 3 SMT-BASED SEARCH
1: status := UNSAT;
2: φB :=
∑
i∈{1,...,p} bi ≤ k;
3: while status == UNSAT do
4: b := SAT-SOLVE(φB);
5: s(b) := {1, 2, . . . , p} − supp(b);
6: (dˆattack,s(b), {xˆs(b)(t)}t∈G)
:= ATTACK-DETECT(s(b), t1);
7: if dˆattack,s(b) == 1 then
8: φcert
:= GENERATE-CERTIFICATE(s(b), {xˆs(b)(t)}t∈G);
9: φB := φB ∧ φcert;
10: end if
11: end while
12: s∗ = s(b);
13: return {xˆs∗(t)}t∈G;
Algorithm 3 still preserves the optimality of the state estimate
as stated by the following result.
Theorem 4. Let the linear dynamical system defined in (2)
be 2k-sparse observable system. Consider a k-adversary sat-
isfying Assumptions 1-5. Consider the state estimate xˆs∗(t)
computed by Algorithm 3. Then, for any  > 0 and δ > 0,
there exists a large enough N such that:
P
(
tr
(
EN,t1
(
es∗e
T
s∗
)) ≤ tr (P?sworst,p−k)+ ) ≥ 1− δ.
(24)
Note that although, for the sake of brevity, we did not
analyze analytically the worst case execution time (in terms
on number of iterations) of Algorithm 3, we show numerical
results in Section VI that support the claim that the proposed
SMT-like solver works much better in practice compared to
the exhaustive search procedure (Algorithm 2).
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we report numerical results for Algorithms 2
and 3 as described by the experiments below.
A. Experiment 1: Residue test performance in Algorithm 2
In this experiment, we numerically check the performance
of the residue test involved in Algorithm 2 while checking
for effective attacks across sensor subsets. We generate a
stable system randomly with n = 20 (state dimension) and
p = 5 sensors. We select k = 2 sensors at random, and
apply a random attack signal to the two sensors. We apply
Algorithm 2 by running all the
(
5
3
)
= 10 Kalman filters
(one for each distinct sensor subset of size 3) and do the
residue test corresponding to each sensor subset. Figure 2
shows the maximum entry in the residue test matrix Rs =
EN,t1
(
rsr
T
s
)−(OsP?sOTs + Ms) for the 10 different Kalman
filters. It is apparent from Figure 2 that only one Kalman filter
produces a state estimate that passes the residue test defined in
Algorithm 1. This indeed corresponds to the set of attack-free
sensors in the experiment.
Algorithm 4 GENERATE-CERTIFICATE(s, {xˆs(t)}t∈G)
1: Compute the residues for i ∈ s
2: ri(t) := yi(t)−Oixˆs(t), ∀t ∈ G = {t1, . . . , t1 +N − 1}
3: µi(t1) :=
∣∣tr (EN,t1 (rirTi )− OiP?sOTi −Mi)− ηn∣∣;
4: Normalize the residues
5: µi(t1) := µi(t1)/λmax
(
OTi Oi
)
,
6: µ(t1) := {µi(t1)}i∈s ;
7: Sort the residues in ascending order
8: µ sorted(t1) := sortAscendingly(µ(t1));
9: Choose sensor indices of p− 2k + 1 smallest residues
10: µ min r := Index (µ sorted[1 : p− 2k + 1]) ;
11: Search linearly for the UNSAT certificate
12: status = UNSAT; counter = 1; φconf-cert = 1; s′ = s
13: while status == UNSAT do
14: s′ := s′ \ µ min r[counter];
15: (dˆattack,s′ , {xˆs′(t)}t∈G) := ATTACK-DETECT(s′, t1);
16: if dˆattack,s′ == 1 then
17: φconf-cert := φconf-cert ∧
∑
i∈s′ bi ≥ 1;
18: counter := counter + 1;
19: else
20: status := SAT;
21: end if
22: end while
23: return φconf-cert
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Fig. 2. Figure showing the maximum entry in the residue test matrix Rs =
EN,t1
(
rsrTs
)−(OsP?sOTs +Ms) for the 10 Kalman filters in Experiment
1 versus the threshold η = 0.7 (indicated by the dashed red line). As shown
in the figure, there is only one subset of sensors which satisfies the threshold
η, and this corresponds to the attack-free set of sensors.
B. Experiment 2: Performance of SMT-based Search
In this experiment, we compare the sensor subset search
time for the SMT-based approach (Algorithm 3) with that
for the exhaustive search approach (Algorithm 2). For this
experiment, we fix n = 50 (state dimension) and vary the
number of sensors from p = 3 to p = 15. For each system,
we pick one third of the sensors to be under attack, i.e.,
k = bp/3c. The attack signal is chosen as a linear function
of the measurement noise. For each system, we run the
bank of
(
p
p−k
)
Kalman filters to generate the state estimates
corresponding to all sensor subsets of size p−k. We then use
both exhaustive search as well as the SMT-based search to find
the sensor subset that satisfies the residue test in Algorithm 1.
Figure 3 shows the average time needed to perform the search
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Fig. 3. Comparison of sensor subset search times for exhaustive search and
SMT based search.
across 50 runs of the same experiment. Figure 3 suggests
that the SMT-based search has an exponential improvement
over exhaustive search as the number of sensors increases. In
particular, for p = 15, the SMT-based search out-performs
exhaustive search by an order of magnitude.
VII. SPARSE OBSERVABILITY: CODING THEORETIC VIEW
In this section, we revisit the sparse observability condition
against a k-adversary and give a coding theoretic interpretation
for the same. We demonstrate how techniques developed for
error correction in classical coding theory [12] can be used
for understanding the resilience of dynamical systems against
malicious attacks3. We first describe our coding theoretic
interpretation for sensor attacks in a linear system, and then
discuss how it can be generalized for non-linear systems.
Consider the linear dynamical system in (2) without the
process and sensor noise (i.e., x (t+ 1) = Ax(t), y(t) =
Cx(t) + a(t)). If the system’s initial state is x(0) ∈ Rn and
the system is θ-sparse observable, then clearly in the absence
of sensor attacks, by observing the outputs from any p − θ
sensors for n time instants (t = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1) we can
exactly recover x(0) and hence, exactly estimate the state of
the plant. A coding theoretic view of this can be given as
follows. Consider the outputs from sensor d ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p}
for n time instants as a symbol Yd ∈ Rn. Thus, in the
(symbol) observation vector Y = [Y1 Y2 . . .Yp], due to
θ-sparse observability, any p−θ symbols are sufficient (in the
absence of attacks) to recover the initial state x(0). Now, let
us consider the case of a k-adversary which can arbitrarily
corrupt any k sensors. In the coding theoretic view, this
corresponds to arbitrarily corrupting any k (out of p) symbols
in the observation vector. Intuitively, based on the relationship
between error correcting codes and the Hamming distance
between codewords in classical coding theory [12], one can
expect the recovery of the initial state despite such corruptions
to depend on the (symbol) Hamming distance between the
observation vectors corresponding to two distinct initial states
(say x(1)(0) and x(2)(0) with x(1)(0) 6= x(2)(0)). In this
3With a similar motivation, in [14] the authors use coding techniques to
enable secure state estimation in the presence of a corrupt observer with
unattacked sensor outputs.
context, the following lemma relates θ-sparse observability to
the minimum Hamming distance between observation vectors
in the absence of attacks.
Lemma 2. For a θ-sparse observable system, the minimum
(symbol) Hamming distance between observation vectors cor-
responding to distinct initial states is θ + 1.
Proof. Consider a system with p sensors, and observation
vectors Y (1) and Y (2) corresponding to distinct initial states
x(1)(0) and x(2)(0). Due to θ-sparse observability, at most
p − θ − 1 symbols in Y (1) and Y (2) can be identical; if any
p−θ of the symbols are identical, this would imply x(1)(0) =
x(2)(0). Hence, the (symbol) Hamming distance between the
observation vectors Y (1) and Y (2) (corresponding to x(1)(0)
and x(2)(0)) is at least p − (p − θ − 1) = θ + 1 symbols.
Also, there exists a pair of initial states
(
x(1)(0),x(2)(0)
)
,
such that the corresponding observation vectors Y (1) and Y (2)
are identical in exactly p − θ − 1 symbols4 and differ in the
rest θ + 1 symbols. Hence, the minimum (symbol) Hamming
distance between the observation vectors is θ + 1.
For a θ-sparse observable system, since the minimum Ham-
ming distance between the observation vectors corresponding
to distinct initial states is θ + 1, we can:
(1) correct up to k < θ+12 sensor corruptions,
(2) detect up to k ≤ θ sensor corruptions.
Note that (1) above is equivalent to 2k ≤ θ (sparse observ-
ability condition for secure state estimation [4]). It should be
noted that a k-adversary can attack any set of k (out of p)
sensors, and the condition k < θ+12 is both necessary and
sufficient for exact state estimation despite such attacks. When
k ≥ θ+12 , it is straightforward to show a scenario where the
observation vector (after attacks) can be explained by multiple
initial states, and hence exact state estimation is not possible.
The following example illustrates such an attack scenario.
Example 2. Consider a θ-sparse observable system with θ =
3, number of sensors p = 5, and a k-adversary with k = 2.
Clearly, the condition k < θ+12 is not satisfied in this example.
Let x(1)(0) and x(2)(0) be distinct initial states, such that
the corresponding observation vectors Y (1) and Y (2) have
(minimum) Hamming distance θ + 1 = 4 symbols. Figure 4
depicts the observation vectors Y (1) and Y (2), and for the sake
of this example, we assume that the observation vectors have
the same first symbol (i.e., Y (1)1 = Y (2)1 = Y1) and differ in
the rest 4 symbols (hence, a Hamming distance of 4). Now, as
shown in Figure 4, suppose the observation vector after attacks
was Y =
[
Y1 Y (1)2 Y (1)3 Y (2)4 Y (2)5
]
. Clearly, there are two
possible explanations for this (attacked) observation vector:
(a) the initial state was x(1)(0) and sensors 4 and 5 were
attacked, or (b) the initial state was x(2)(0) and sensors 2 and
3 were attacked. Since there are two possibilities, we cannot
estimate the initial state exactly given the attacked observation
4If there is no such pair of initial states, the initial state can be recovered
by observing any p− θ − 1 sensors. By definition, in a θ-sparse observable
system, θ is the largest positive integer, such that the initial state can be
recovered by observing any p− θ sensors.
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Y (1) Y (2)
Y1 Y (1)2 Y (1)3 Y (2)4 Y (2)5
Y
x(1)(0) x(2)(0)
Fig. 4. Example with θ = 3, p = 5 and k = 2. For dis-
tinct initial states x(1)(0) and x(2)(0), the corresponding observation
vectors are Y(1) and Y(2). Given (attacked) observation vector Y =[
Y1 Y(1)2 Y(1)3 Y(2)4 Y(2)5
]
, there are two possibilities for the initial state:
(a) x(1)(0) with attacks on sensors 4 and 5, or (b) x(2)(0) with attacks on
sensors 2 and 3.
vector. This example can be easily generalized to show the
necessity of the condition k < θ+12 .
For (noiseless) non-linear systems, by analogously defining
θ-sparse observability, the same coding theoretic interpretation
holds. This leads to the necessary and sufficient conditions for
attack detection and secure state estimation in any noiseless
dynamical system with sensor attacks.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof details for Theorem 2
1) Proof of (16) using LLN:
tr
(
Msg
)− tr (EN,t1 (zsgzTsg))
=
1
n
n−1∑
l=0
tr
(
Msg
)− 1
N
∑
t∈G
tr
(
zsg (t)z
T
sg (t)
)
(a)
=
n−1∑
l=0
1
n
(
tr
(
Msg
)− 1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
zsg (t)z
T
sg (t)
))
≤
n−1∑
l=0
1
n
∣∣∣∣∣tr (Msg)− 1NB ∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
zsg (t)z
T
sg (t)
)∣∣∣∣∣
(b)
≤ 1,
where (a) follows from partitioning time window G (of size
N ) into n groups G0, G1, . . . Gn−1 (each of size NB) such
that Gl = {t| ((t− t1) mod n) = l}, and (b) follows w.h.p.
from LLN (for different time indices in Gl, tr
(
zsg (t)z
T
sg (t)
)
corresponds to i.i.d. realizations of the same random variable).
2) Cross term analysis and proof of (17): The cross term
2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
can be written down as a sum of n terms
as shown below:
2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
(a)
=
2
n
n−1∑
l=0
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)Osges(t)
)
=
2
n
n−1∑
l=0
ζl, (25)
where (a) follows from partitioning time window G (of size
N ) into n groups G0, G1, . . . Gn−1 (each of size NB) such
that Gl = {t| ((t− t1) mod n) = l}. Now, we will show that
each ζl has zero mean and vanishingly small variance for large
enough N . The mean analysis can be done as shown below:
E (ζl) = E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)Osges(t)
)
(a)
=
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
E
(
zTsg (t)
)
E
(
Osges(t)
)
= 0, (26)
where (a) follows from the independence of es(t) from zTsg (t)
(due to assumptions 4 and 5). This implies that the cross term
2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
has zero mean. As a consequence of (26)
and (16),
21 ≥ E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
(
Osg
(
ese
T
s −P?s
)
OTsg
)))
= E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
((
ese
T
s −P?s
)
OTsgOsg
)))
(a)
≥ λmin
(
OTsgOsg
)
E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
(
ese
T
s −P?s
)))
, (27)
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where (a) follows from Lemma 3 (discussed in Appendix B).
Using (27),
E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
(
ese
T
s
))) ≤ 21
λmin
(
OTsgOsg
) + tr (P?s) . (28)
We will use the intermediate result (28) in the variance analysis
of ζl =
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)Osges(t) =
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
described below.
For any 2 > 0, there exists a large enough NB such that:
V ar
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
= E
( 1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2
−
(
E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
))2
(a)
= E
( 1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e
T
s (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+ E
 2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl, t<t′
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e
T
s (t
′)OTsgzsg (t
′)

(b)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e
T
s (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl, t<t′
E
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e
T
s (t
′)OTsg
)
E
(
zsg (t
′)
)
(c)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e
T
s (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
(
OTsgzsg (t)
)T
es(t)
)
(d)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
(
OTsgzsg (t)
)T
es(t)
))
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
OTsgzsg (t)
(
OTsgzsg (t)
)T
es(t)e
T
s (t)
))
(e)
=
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)z
T
sg (t)Osg
)
E
(
es(t)e
T
s (t)
))
(f)
≤ 1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
λmax
(
OTsgMsgOsg
)
tr
(
E
(
es(t)e
T
s (t)
))
=
λmax
(
OTsgMsgOsg
)
NB
E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
es(t)e
T
s (t)
))
=
λmax
(
OTsgMsgOsg
)
NB
E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)es(t)
)
=
nλmax
(
OTsgMsgOsg
)
NB
E
(
1
N
∑
t∈Gl
es
T (t)es(t)
)
≤
nλmax
(
OTsgMsgOsg
)
E
(
1
N
∑
t∈G e
T
s (t)es(t)
)
NB
(g)
≤ 2, (29)
where (a) follows from (26), (b) follows from the in-
dependence of zsg (t
′) from eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e
T
s (t
′)OTsg for
t′ > t, (c) follows from E
(
zsg (t
′)
)
= 0, (d) follows
from eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t) being a scalar, (e) follows from the
independence of zsg (t) from es(t), (f) follows from Lemma 3
(discussed in Appendix B) with,
λmax
(
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)
(
OTsgzsg (t)
)T))
= λmax
(
OTsgMsgOsg
)
. (30)
Finally, (g) follows from (28) for large enough NB . This com-
pletes the variance analysis of ζl, and clearly ζl has vanishingly
small variance as NB → ∞. As a consequence, the vari-
ance of the cross term 2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
=
2
n
n−1∑
l=0
ζl is also
vanishingly small for NB → ∞ (follows from the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality). Since the cross term 2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
has zero mean and vanishingly small variance, by the Cheby-
shev inequality,
∣∣∣2EN,t1 (zTsgOsges)∣∣∣ ≤ 1 holds w.h.p., and
this completes the proof of (17).
B. Bounds on the trace of product of symmetric matrices
A useful lemma from [15] can be described as follows.
Lemma 3. If A and B are two symmetric matrices in Rn×n,
and B is positive semi-definite:
λmin (A) tr (B) ≤ tr (AB) ≤ λmax (A) tr (B) . (31)
C. Results for the filtering version of the Kalman filter
As stated in Section II, we use the prediction version of
the Kalman filter for deriving our main results in this paper.
Proving similar results for the filtering version can be done
using the same techniques used for the prediction version. In
the remainder of this Section, we will first describe the filtering
setup with some additional notation, and then describe our
effective attack detector for the filtering setup.
1) Filtering setup and additional notation: The state esti-
mate update rule for the filtering version of the Kalman filter
(in steady state) is as shown below [13]:
xˆ(t) = xˆ(P )(t) + L
(
y(t)−Cxˆ(P )(t)
)
, (32)
xˆ(P )(t+ 1) = Axˆ(t), (33)
where L is the steady state Kalman filter gain, and xˆ(t) is
the (filtered) state estimate at time t (which also depends
on the output at time t). We denote by Ls the steady state
Kalman filter gain when only outputs from sensor subset s ⊆
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{1, 2, . . . , p} are used, and use F?s for the corresponding filter-
ing error covariance matrix. In addition, we use the following
notation for the senor noise in subset s = {i1, i2, . . . , i|s|} at
time t:
v˜s(t) =

vi1(t)
vi2(t)
...
vi|s|(t)
 , (34)
and define ∆s as shown below:
∆s = E
(
zs(t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
s
)
, (35)
where zs(t) = Jsw¯(t) + v¯s(t) (as defined for the prediction
setup in Section III). Note that ∆s can be easily expressed
(after evaluating the expectation in (35)) in terms of σ2v , L
T
s ,
and OTs ; we define ∆s just for conveniently describing our
detector and proving its performance guarantees. In the predic-
tion setup, we limited the the adversary through Assumptions
1-5; however, in the filtering setup, to show similar results, we
require stronger versions of Assumptions 4 and 5 as described
below:
Assumption 6. The adversary’s knowledge at time t is statis-
tically independent of w(t′) for t′ ≥ t, i.e., a(t) is statistically
independent of {w(t′)}t′≥t.
Assumption 7. For an attack-free sensor i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p} \ κ,
the adversary’s knowledge at time t (and hence a(t)) is
statistically independent of {vi(t′)}t′≥t.
Using these assumptions, we define the effective attack
detection problem for the filtering setup as follows.
Definition 3 ((, s)-Effective Attack (filtering)). Consider the
linear dynamical system under attack Σa as defined in (2), and
a k-adversary satisfying Assumptions 1-3 and Assumptions 6-
7. For the set of sensors s, an  > 0, and a large enough
N ∈ N, an attack signal is called (, s)-effective at time t1 if
the following bound holds:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
ese
T
s
))
> tr(F?s) + ,
where es(t) = x(t)− xˆs(t) (with xˆs(t) being the filtered state
estimate).
Note that, compared to Definition 1 for the prediction setup,
we have just replaced P?s by F
?
s as shown above. In the
following subsections, we describe the effective attack detector
for the filtering setup and prove its performance guarantees.
2) -effective attack detector for filtering setup: The ef-
fective attack detector for the filtering setup is described in
Algorithm 5. Compared to Algorithm 1 for the prediction
setup, Algorithm 5 mainly differs in the residue test; F?s is
used in place of P?s , and the extra terms −∆s −∆Ts account
for the dependence of the estimation error at time t on the
sensor noise at time t (details in the following subsection
on performance guarantees). Note that the expected value
of rs(t)rTs (t) in the absence of attacks is exactly equal to
OsF?sO
T
s + Ms − ∆s − ∆Ts ; as in the prediction version,
the residue test basically checks if the sample average of
rs(t)r
T
s (t) in the presence of attacks is close to its expected
value in the absence of attacks.
Algorithm 5 FILTERING ATTACK-DETECT(s, t1)
1: Run a Kalman filter that uses all measurements from
sensors indexed by s until time t1 and compute the
estimate xˆs(t1) ∈ Rn.
2: Recursively repeat the previous step N − 1 times to
calculate all estimates xˆs(t) ∈ Rn, ∀t ∈ G = {t1, t1 +
1, . . . , t1 +N − 1}.
3: For time t ∈ G, calculate the block residue:
rs(t) = y¯s(t)− Osxˆs(t) ∀t ∈ G.
4: if block residue test defined below holds,
EN,t1
(
rsr
T
s
)− (OsF?sOTs + Ms −∆s −∆Ts )
4 η 1n|s|1Tn|s|, (36)
where 0 < η ≤
(
λmin,s\k
3n(|s|−k)
)
 , then
5: assert dˆattack,s(t1) := 0
6: else
7: assert dˆattack,s(t1) := 1
8: end if
9: return (dˆattack,s(t1), {xˆs(t)}t∈G)
3) Performance guarantees for Algorithm 5: The following
lemma states the performance guarantees for Algorithm 5 in
the context of detecting -effective attacks in the filtering setup.
Lemma 4. Let the linear dynamical system as defined in (2)
be 2k-sparse observable. Consider a k-adversary satisfying
Assumptions 1−3 and Assumptions 6−7, and a sensor subset
s ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p} with |s| ≥ p − k. For any  > 0 and δ >
0, there exists a large enough time window length N such
that when Algorithm 5 terminates with dˆattack,s(t1) = 0, the
following probability bound holds:
P
(
tr
(
Et1,N
(
ese
T
s
)− F?s) ≤ ) ≥ 1− δ, (37)
where es(t) = x(t) − xˆs(t) is the (filtering) state estimation
error.
Proof. The proof is similar to that for the prediction version
(Lemma 1). The main difference lies in the cross term analysis;
it is more involved than in the prediction version due to the
dependence of estimation error at time t on the sensor noise
at time t. We describe the proof details below.
Since we assume that the set s has cardinality |s| ≥ p−k, we
can conclude that there exists a subset sg ⊂ s with cardinality
|sg| ≥ p − 2k sensors such that all its sensors are attack-
free (subscript g in sg stands for good sensors in s). Hence,
by decomposing the set s into an attack-free set sg and a
potentially attacked set s \ sg , we can conclude that, after a
permutation similarity transformation for (36), the following
holds for the attack-free subset sg:
EN,t1
(
rsgr
T
sg
)
− OsgF?sOTsg −Msg + ∆sg + ∆Tsg
4 η 1n(|s|−k)1Tn(|s|−k),
(38)
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where ∆sg = E
(
zsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sg
)
. Therefore,
tr
(
EN,t1
(
rsgr
T
sg
)
− OsgF?sOTsg −Msg + ∆sg + ∆Tsg
)
≤ n(|s| − k)η = 1. (39)
As in the prediction version, we can rewrite
tr
(
EN,t1
(
rsgr
T
sg
))
as:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
rsgr
T
sg
))
= tr
(
OsgEN,t1
(
ese
T
s
)
OTsg
)
+ tr
(
EN,t1
(
zsgz
T
sg
))
+ 2EN,t1
(
eTs O
T
sgzsg
)
. (40)
By combining (39) and (40):
tr
(
OsgEN,t1
(
ese
T
s
)
OTsg − OsgF?sOTsg
)
≤ tr (Msg)− tr (EN,t1 (zsgzTsg))+ 1
− 2EN,t1
(
eTs O
T
sgzsg
)
− 2tr (∆sg)
(a)
≤ 21 − 2EN,t1
(
eTs O
T
sgzsg
)
− 2tr (∆sg) (41)
(b)
≤ 31, (42)
where (a) follows w.h.p. due to the law of large num-
bers (LLN) for large enough N (as shown in Appendix
A1), and (b) follows w.h.p. by showing that the cross term
2EN,t1
(
eTOTsgzsg
)
has mean equal to −2tr (∆sg) and van-
ishingly small variance for large enough N . The cross term
analysis is described in detail in Appendix D. Using (42), the
following holds:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
ese
T
s − F?s
)
OTsgOsg
)
≤ 31, (43)
and hence, we get the following bound which completes the
proof:
tr
(
EN,t1
(
ese
T
s
)− F?s) (c)≤ 31
λmin
(
OTsgOsg
) (d)≤ 31
λmin,s\k
≤ 
(44)
where (c) follows from Lemma 3 in Appendix B and (d)
follows from the definition of λmin,s\k. Note that, it follows
from |sg| ≥ p − 2k and 2k-sparse observability, that both
λmin
(
OTsgOsg
)
and λmin,s\k are bounded away from zero.
Using Lemma 4, deriving results for secure state estimation
in the filtering setup is straightforward, and we skip the details
for brevity.
D. Cross term analysis for filtering and proof of (42)
As in the prediction setup, the cross term
2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
can be written down as a sum of n
terms as shown below:
2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
(a)
=
2
n
n−1∑
l=0
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)Osges(t)
)
=
2
n
n−1∑
l=0
ζl,
where (a) follows from partitioning time window G (of size
N ) into n groups G0, G1, . . . Gn−1 (each of size NB) such
that Gl = {t| ((t− t1) mod n) = l}. Now, we will show that
each ζl has mean equal to −tr
(
∆sg
)
and vanishingly small
variance for large enough N . The mean analysis can be done
as shown below:
E (ζl) = E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)Osges(t)
)
(a)
= E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)Osg (e˜s(t)− Lsv˜s(t))
)
= E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)Osg e˜s(t)
)
− E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)OsgLsv˜s(t)
)
(b)
=
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
E
(
zTsg (t)
)
E
(
Osg e˜s(t)
)
− E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)OsgLsv˜s(t)
)
= −E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)OsgLsv˜s(t)
)
= −E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
zTsg (t)OsgLsv˜s(t)
))
= −E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
tr
((
OsgLsv˜s(t)
)T
zsg (t)
))
= −E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
))
= −E
(
1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
zsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sg
))
= − 1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
E
(
zsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sg
))
= − 1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
∆sg
)
= −tr (∆sg) , (45)
where (a) follows from expressing es(t) as e˜s(t) − Lsv˜s(t)
(i.e., separating out the sensor noise at time t component
in es(t)), and (b) follows from the independence of e˜s(t)
from zTsg (t) (follows from assumptions 6 and 7). This implies
that the cross term 2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
has mean equal to
14
−2tr (∆sg). Also, using (45) and (41),
21 ≥ E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
(
Osg
(
ese
T
s − F?s
)
OTsg
)))
= E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
((
ese
T
s − F?s
)
OTsgOsg
)))
(a)
≥ λmin
(
OTsgOsg
)
E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
(
ese
T
s − F?s
)))
, (46)
where (a) follows from Lemma 3 (discussed in Appendix B).
Using (46),
E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
(
ese
T
s
))) ≤ 21
λmin
(
OTsgOsg
) + tr (F?s) . (47)
We will use the above intermediate result in the variance
analysis done below.
The variance analysis for ζl can be done as shown below:
E
( 1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
zTsg (t)Osges(t)
)2
= E
( 1
NB
∑
t∈Gl
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
+ E
 2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl,t<t′
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e
T
s (t
′)OTsgzsg (t
′)

= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
+ E
 2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl,t<t′
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e˜
T
s (t
′)OTsgzsg (t
′)

− E
 2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl,t<t′
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t
′)LTs O
T
sgzsg (t
′)

(a)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
+
2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl,t<t′
E
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e˜
T
s (t
′)OTsg
)
E
(
zsg (t
′)
)
− E
 2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl,t<t′
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t
′)LTs O
T
sgzsg (t
′)

= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
+ 0
− E
 2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl,t<t′
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t
′)LTs O
T
sgzsg (t
′)

= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
− 2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl,t<t′
(
E
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
× E
(
v˜Ts (t
′)LTs O
T
sgzsg (t
′)
))
(b)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
+
2
N2B
∑
t,t′∈Gl,t<t′
(
tr
(
∆sg
))2
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
+
NB (NB − 1)
N2B
(
tr
(
∆sg
))2
, (48)
where (a) follows from independence of zsg (t
′)
from eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e˜
T
s (t
′)OTsg for t < t
′, and (b)
follows from E
(
v˜Ts (t
′)LTs O
T
sgzsg (t
′)
)
= tr
(
∆sg
)
and
E
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
= −tr (∆sg). Now, we focus on
analyzing the first term in (48) as shown below. For any
2 > 0, there exists a large enough NB such that:
E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
eTs (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
(e˜s(t)− Lsv˜s(t))T OTsgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
((
e˜Ts (t)− v˜Ts (t)LTs
)
OTsgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)− v˜Ts (t)LTs OTsgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
− E
(
2
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+ E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
− E
(
2
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
(
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
− 2
(∑
t∈Gl
E(e˜Ts (t))
NB
)
NB
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
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= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)e˜
T
s (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
− 2
(∑
t∈Gl
E(e˜Ts (t))
NB
)
NB
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)z
T
sg (t)Osg e˜s(t)
)
− 2
(∑
t∈Gl
E(e˜Ts (t))
NB
)
NB
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
e˜Ts (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)z
T
sg (t)Osg e˜s(t)
))
− 2
(∑
t∈Gl
E(e˜Ts (t))
NB
)
NB
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
= E
(
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
e˜s(t)e˜
T
s (t)O
T
sgzsg (t)z
T
sg (t)Osg
))
− 2
(∑
t∈Gl
E(e˜Ts (t))
NB
)
NB
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
=
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
E
(
e˜s(t)e˜
T
s (t)
)
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)z
T
sg (t)Osg
))
− 2
(∑
t∈Gl
E(e˜Ts (t))
NB
)
NB
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
=
1
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
E
(
e˜s(t)e˜
T
s (t)
) (
OTsgMsgOsg
))
− 2
(∑
t∈Gl
E(e˜Ts (t))
NB
)
NB
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
(a)
≤
λmax
(
OTsgMsgOsg
)
N2B
∑
t∈Gl
tr
(
E
(
e˜s(t)e˜
T
s (t)
))
− 2
(∑
t∈Gl
E(e˜Ts (t))
NB
)
NB
E
(
OTsgzsg (t)v˜
T
s (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)
+
1
NB
E
((
v˜Ts (t)L
T
s O
T
sgzsg (t)
)2)
(b)
≤ 2, (49)
where (a) follows from Lemma 3 (discussed in Appendix B),
and (b) follows for large enough NB from the boundedness
of E
(
EN,t1
(
tr
(
ese
T
s
)))
as shown in (47).
Using (49) and (48), for any 3 > 0, there exists a large
enough NB such that:
V ar(ζl) = E(ζ2l )− (E(ζl))2
(a)
≤ 3 +
(
tr
(
∆sg
))2 − (tr (∆sg))2 = 3, (50)
where (a) follows from (49) and (48). This completes the
variance analysis of ζl, and clearly ζl has vanishingly small
variance as NB →∞. As a consequence, the variance of the
cross term 2EN,t1
(
zTsgOsges
)
=
2
n
n−1∑
l=0
ζl is also vanishingly
small for NB → ∞ (follows from the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality). This completes the proof of (42).
